

















How can theories of science yield both a language by which we can describe and understand the world and be a true description of nature? How can a fundamental theory be prescriptive and descriptive at the same time? This dilemma is what I want to address in this paper which is dedicated to Avandro Agazzi in the acknowledgment of his indefatigable service for the philosophy of science.    
       The view of science inherited from Descartes, Newton and others of the seventeenth century philosophers and scientists is that a perfect physical theory is an axiomatic system in which laws of nature are derived as theorems from few self‑evident principles. Philosophers, like Karl R. Popper, have considered a physical theory to be a hypothetical-deductive system. Moreover a physical theory is regarded by most philosophers and physicists as something that can be true or false unless they have had strong empiricist or instrumentalist inclina​tions. These realist-minded scientists and philoso​phers have claimed that the aim of science is to search for true theories in order to explain the results of experiments and observations. Of course, this search is an ongoing battle in which old theories are replaced by new ones concurrent​ly with the knowledge of the scientif​ic community grows, but every new theory is closer to the truth than the old one. Although this picture of science has been challenged by some philoso​phers of science, like Thomas B. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Larry Laudan, it is still very prevalent among scientific realists. Moreover, even current empiricists, like Bas van Fraassen, who don't want to be lumped with old-fashioned instrumentalists, regard theories as true or false in spite of the fact that we are deprived of finding them other than empirically adequate. According to this opinion, a new and more successful theory is merely better to save the phenomena than the old and less successful one.
     I shall argue that theories are neither axiomatic nor hypotheti​cal‑deductive constructions.  So-called theoreti​cal laws are neither true nor false due to the fact that they don’t have a factual content. Rather I take causal general​iza​tions among observables to have a true value. On the face of it this seems to indicate an approval of instrumentalism with respect to theories. I maintain, however, that things which cannot be seen by the naked eye may still be observable.​[2]​ Theoretical names and predicates need not be heuristic terms but may refer to real entities and properties. Causal laws are therefore concerned with invisible entities as well. 
     As a start we have to tell how it is possible that theoretical names and predicates can have a reference while theoretical laws are neither true nor false. The request of information in science requires often a causal story as the most appropriate response. Such a story relies on the warranted assumption that things and events in questions are real. But how can theoretical terms stand for something in the world whenever they appear in causal explanations if they don’t refer to anything as parts of a theory or a set of theoretical laws? It will be argued that a theory is not a representation of reality but first and foremost an explicitly defined language which enables us to express various representations of the world. What has the power to act as representations are models of concrete systems. It is these models that supply us with the material for telling the causal stories. 


	1. Models of the system
All knowledge is based on selection and abstraction of informa​tion. Every thing can be described in various ways depending on the purpose and interest of those who gathers information. The ontological perspective of investigation may change according to the epistemic objectives we have in a given situation. Newton's legendary apple may be taken to be a physical, chemical, botanical, gastronomical, or an economical object. But even within one disci​pline of a science the descrip​tion of an object can vary with distinct research perspec​tives. It depends on our background knowl​edge, our cognitive aims and interests, and practical purposes which features we consider as relevant for a description of the object and which not. In science we wish to give explanations, and will automatically focus on those features which take part in such explanations. And for that purpose we create models. In the attempt to under​stand a phenomenon as a result of the behavior and the develop​ment of a concrete system, the scientist will form a model of the system by selecting and isolating some of its proper​ties while abstract​ing from others. A model is a represen​tation of a system in which certain features – important, say, for a causal descrip​tion of the system – is accentuated, whereas the rest of the features are down-played or entirely omitted. My suggestion is that the basic elements of the model refer to real objects and processes in virtue of certain exit rules and identifying criteria. 
     Further​more, I also hold that fundamental laws, or princi​ples, are not concerned with reality. Theories don't represent anything. They form an abstract language system. I maintain that theories are only applica​ble on models because models are suffi​ciently idealized to bring the language of theory into play. As Cartwright has ably noted, “The route from theory to reality is from theory to model, and then from model to the phenomenological laws.”​[3]​ What a theory does for a model is providing it with a language in which we can give a causal description of the elements of the model and thereby give a causal explanation of the phenomenon under investi​gation.
     The essential difference between theory and model is that a theory is about properties, and how such properties are related to each other, whereas a model is concerned with concrete objects, and how such objects should be represented to fit a theory. Thus a model is an abstract or a physical, but much idealized, representation of a concrete system where the objects of the system are constructed in the model in such a manner that it is possible to use the language of the theory to talk about them.  A theory usually covers many different types of models. Newtonian mechanics is used to describe models of single pendulums, coupled pendulums, springs, central force systems, tilted planes, rigid body movements, many particle interactions, flows in water pipes, etc. This endows different roles to models and theories in the scientific practice. In laborato​ries over the world, hundreds of well-designed experiments fail every year to yield the expected result, though well-established theories are being used to calculate the wrong predictions. But for that reason no scientist would ever dream of parting himself from the theories by regarding them as falsified. What is at stake is not the theory but the model of system, i.e. whether a certain specific representation of the objects under investiga​tions is adequate and accurate enough. The theory itself is well separated from any of the working hypothesis of the accuracy of a particular model.  So what failed the test is the prediction based on the model of the system, and not the theory in question.  
     Models give an idealized representation of the world but models are neither true nor false. Maps are rather good models of geographical sites. We would not say about a city map that it gives us a true representation of the city. For instance, a map of Rome with a scale of 1:25.000 usually gives many more details than one with a scale of 1:100.000. It would, nevertheless, be very inappropriate to say that the map with a scale of 1:25.000 is closer to the truth than the one of 1:100.000. Maps may be more or less accurate, be more or less adequate in their representation. Whether or not a map is adequate depends on the context. In one context the same map is very adequate because it allows me to accomplish my task of getting around, whereas in another it is completely inadequate because I cannot accomplish this task. Indeed, given a certain conventions, it is also possible to talk about a correct representation.  If the convention of a map is that churches are symbolized as crosses and post offices as envelops, it would be incorrect of the cartographer to put an envelop at the spot of Santa Maria sopra Minerva. So a map of Rome is correct as along as it represents things according to the rules of its own stipulation; however, it starts to contain incorrect elements in case it misrepresents things in virtue of not obeying the rules outlaid. 
    Although maps by themselves are neither true nor false, they allow their users to say something true or false about the world. If I take a look at a map of Rome, I could produce a lot of true sentences about Rome. A sentence as “Piazza della Rotunda is only 150 meters due east of Piazza Navona” would be such a true sentence, but if I say, because the map shows a sign of a post office at Piazza della Minerva, “There is a post office at Piazza della Minerva,” then it would be false what I am claiming. The same holds for models of science. Scientific models can also be accurate, adequate, and correct (in accordance to a stipulated convention), as well as inaccurate, inadequate, and incorrect. A scientific model is accurate, if it enables us to predict the observed data, and adequate if it helps us to produce an appropriate explanation of the phenomena in question. It is such explanations and predictions that are true or false, not the models themselves.
     Model-building starts out by laying down which real entities we are dealing with. At first the scientist faces some phenomena he wishes to explain and decides whether he can use a well-known standard model on his repertoire or should enlarge or correct the standard model or even perhaps go for a new model. Take a simple example as the behavior of a gas in a piston. This phenomenon is related to molecules. We have experimental methods to establish that gasses form a swarm of molecules moving around among each other. The second step is concerned with the supply of the right dynamical properties to these molecules. We know indeed that real molecules have many proper​ties partly depending on their specific nature. But we are only interested in those properties which will be relevant for the causal description of the behavior of the gas when we know that it made up by molecules. These properties are mass, position, motion, and perhaps internal and external forces. What we have is the old experimental law of coexistence, PV = nRT, stating the function between pressure, volume, and tempera​ture. What we need is a description of how the pressure, volume, and temperature are causally related to the behavior of the molecules. In order to make this task practicable, we set up a standard model in which the molecules do form an ideal gas which means that we represent the above properties of molecules by some abstract and idealized properties such as being completely elastic, mono-atomic point-masses. We can then apply the kinetic gas theory on this model and derive the Boyle’s law.
     Another example of model-making can be found in micro-economy. Here one operates with the concept of an idealized economical agent called homo oeconomicus.​[4]​ This fictitious agent is attributed some very abstract and idealized properties that allows economics to describe his economical actions. First, he has a clear defined set of preferences; that is, he has a list of priorities of the possible results of the actions that are open to him. Second, he has a perfect knowledge of the possible actions and their consequences. And third, he is seen as completely rational in the sense that he always chooses the best possible action which is open to him, given his preferences.
     A model is a physical or an abstract representation of a concrete system.  But if many features of a model are idealizations in the sense that they do not correspond to anything as it is, how can we then claim that the model represents something in reality? The answer is that we can because not every element and not every feature of a model is without a real counter​part. The model of the ideal gas in which “molecules” are mono-atomic point-masses refers to real molecules that move around in a container, bouncing into the walls and each other. The model of homo oeconomicus in which “consumers” are completely rational calculators refers to real human beings that have prefer​ences and make economical arrange​ments. There is nothing abstract or idealized about these natural entities and their properties. But we would not be able to use the language of a theory to explain the behavior of gases and persons if it were impossible to make ideal assumptions about some of their properties in question. For ascribing those precisely defined and idealized attributes to the molecules and the economical agents make it possible to calculate how they will behave in a normal situation. So with respect to these ideal attributes the model is definitely not representative. But we don’t care as long as the model provides us with the basis of a causal understanding of the system and the phenomena associated with it.
     The selection of the relevant features will often build on the assumption of an analogy between two systems; that is, the ascription of attributes to a system under investigation is based on a certain supposed resemblance between that system and an already well-understood system. Sometimes we also see different, and even disparate, models in work in order to describe every aspect of the system under investiga​tion. Nuclear physics provides a good illustration of both features.
    The nucleus is a quantum system: it means that its energy, spin, and angular momentum are quantized and describ​able by different quantum numbers. The experimental study of the atomic nucleus can be carried out in more than one way. A simple one is sending a beam of monoenergetic particles carrying a positive charge into a target. The upshot is the emission of gamma particles from the atoms, where the gamma particles are distributed with a spectrum of different quantized energies. The spectrum is of course different according as the sort of target it is. What physicists do is that they explain the detected energies in virtue of telling a causal story of what happens inside the atom from the moment the beam hits it and till energy leaves it again. For that purpose physicists need a model of the nucleus on which they can apply their equations. In general nuclear physicists work with two opposing models which are borrowed from classical physics. The first is the shell model. It considers every nucleon as moving in a certain orbit that is determined by the mean power field of the other nucleons. Such a model is especially useful for explaining the effect of the individual particle movements inside the atomic nucleus. Whenever one knows the potential energy in which the nucleon moves, Schrödinger’s wave equation gives all properties of the possible orbits. This allows us to calculate the various energy spectra. But the shell model does not allow a precise description of all properties of the nucleus. This is not due to the fact that we lack knowledge of the precise form and magnitude of the potential, but rather that the complex interactions in a nucleus cannot be represented by one common potential for all nucleons. The second model is the drop model. Here the nucleus is considered to be an ensemble and to behave like a water drop. Just like a water drop the nucleus is assumed to be able to change its shape and thereby getting into vibrations and rota​tions. And nuclear matter is rather incompressible like most fluids. The drop model focuses on the collective movements of the nucleons and makes it possible to explain phenomena such as nuclear fission.
     Thus scientific models enable us to produce explanation by picturing a system as having a certain structure and participating in certain processes. Models are simplified and idealized representations of concrete systems where 1) the particular entities of the systems are pictured by abstract entities of a certain kind, and where 2) the dynamical structure of the systems is represented by phenomenological laws. Models mimic entities and processes; whereas theories seem to provide us with the rules for talking about these entities and processes. The model dressed in the language of a certain theory helps us to explain our measure​ments and observations. But the theory gives us the possibilities of describing the scientific data.

2. The semantic perspective on theories
The semantic view of scientific theories understands models differently from what I have described. A model of a theory is an interpre​tation of a theory that makes it true. This notion is distinct from the notion according to which a model is an abstract represen​tation of a concrete system, situation, or phenomenon. The first kind of models can be called semantic models of the theory, whereas the second kind for theoretical models; i.e., astronomi​cal, physical, chemical, biological, economical, psychological, and sociological models. We thus have that the distinction between models of the mathematical formalism and models of descriptions of reality corresponding to the distinction between formal and informal seman​tics.
     A previous understanding of scientific theories, which was once the orthodox view held by the logical positivists, is associated with the syntactic approach. The focus is also here on the axiomatic formulations of theories very much as it is on the semantic approach. The former, however, is a bottom-up account of the meaning of scientific theories. The positivists and their successors saw theories as a set of well-formed formulas that could be expressed in terms of first-order mathematical logic. Apart from the logical constants, the language of a theory consists of a dictionary of two disjoint sets of vocabularies: the stock of theoretical terms and observa​tion terms respective​ly. The terms of the observation vocabulary are interpreted as referring directly to visually accessible physical objects or attributes of physical objects, whereas the terms of the theoretical vocabulary receive their meaning through an explicit definition in terms of the observation vocabulary. These definitions are the notorious corresponding rules. 
      In contrast, the semantic view is a top-down account of the meaning of scientific theories. The semantic approach starts out with an axiomatic system in which the axioms and the theorems are interpreted by postulat​ing a domain of entities over which individual variables range, together with the assignment of appropriate entities defined with respect to this domain for each of the non-logical constants of the system, while one allows n-place predicates to run over n-order relations among the individuals. Thereby one attributes a specific truth value to the various propositions.
    Whatever approach to scientific theories philosophers of science have chosen, they often consider them to have the property of being true or false. For instance, a variant of the earlier view is the hypothetical-deductive approach to theories. It regards theories as conjectures which are (approximately) true or false. Of course, instrumen​tal​ists believe that a theory is neither true nor false because it is nothing but a tool of calculations and predictions about observable phenomena. But instrumentalists have had their day. 
     An essential component of the semantic view seems also to be that a theory is capable of having a truth value. The original model-theoretic insight behind this approach is that every sound interpreta​tion I under which all T's formulas are true, is a model of T, when T is a theory, and an interpre​ta​tion is the assign​ment of any structure or any class of objects that satisfies T. A theory is therefore identical with a class of structures which is its models; and the family of models forms the truth conditions of the theory, that is all possible interpreta​tions which supply the theory with truth. If one of these models represents the real world, the theory is true with respect to what is actually the case.
     In his editorial introduc​tion to The Structures of Scientif​ic Theories, F. Suppe, one of the propo​nents of the semantic view of theories, suggests in opposition to Toulmin: “I think he is wrong, however, in his insistence that theories are neither true nor false, but rather are rules for drawing inferences about phenomena.”​[5]​ Another adherent of the semantic view of theories, Bas van Fraassen, also claims, despite his antirealism, that the language of science should be literally con​strued, and, under​stood in this way, a theory is true. As he expresses himself in Laws and Symmetry: “With the realist I take it that a theory is the sort of thing that can be true or false, that can describe reality correctly or incorrect​ly, and that we may believe or disbe​lieve.”​[6]​ A theory, moreover, is empirically adequate if parts of its models can be identified as empirical substructures, and these are true representations of observable phenomena or appearances. To be a true representa​tion requires, according to van Fraassen, that the appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of the model in question. It means that a theory can fit all observa​tions but still be false. In that case the world is different from what the theory suggests it to be, although only with respect to what we cannot settle by experi​ence. Furthermore, van Fraassen maintains that “scien​tific models may, without detriment to their function, contain much structure which corresponds to no elements of reality at all.”​[7]​ There is not necessarily an isomorphism between the world and all parts of every model. For instance, van Fraassen believes that any modal or causal structure manifested by our models does not correspond to any feature of the world. Such models do not allow their theory to be true even if the theory is empiri​cal​ly adequate.
     Based on what is said thus far, we can summarize the semantic approach by means of a few headlines: (1) a theory consists of a set of interpreted sentences; (2) a theory is true or false; (3) a theory does not refer directly to physical objects and their attributes, there is no direct relationship between the set of interpreted sentences and the world, the relation​ship is indirect​ly mediated through a model; and (4) an interpretation is a model made up of nonlinguistic, abstract entities. Indeed, these headlines raise some queries: why do we need models as a medium for interpretations? Can we say something about the relation between a theory and its models, on the one hand, and a model and the world on the other which assures us that our understand​ing of a theory is obtained by the construction of a model?
      We may find some help in Ronald Giere, who advocates the semantic view on theories, even though his view is somewhat different from van Fraassen’s and other proponents’. In Explaining Science he perceives the situation as one in which the mathematical symbols of a theory are linked with general terms or concepts. For example, the symbol ‘x’ is connected to “position”. The mathematical symbols are then linked with certain features of a specific object.​[8]​ The first step is called the problem of interpretation, while the second is named the problem of identification. The interpretation of a theory thus provides us with a model when we specify which objects satisfy the axioms of the theory. The theory is a linguistic system of sentences or equations, whereas its model is an abstract, nonlinguis​tic entity. A single theory may have many different models that can be viewed as a family of models. 
     Now, it is Giere’s view that the relationship between the theory and its corresponding models can be described as one of defini​tion: a theoretical definition characterizes a class of models and the equations truly describe the members of this class, because the models are defined as something that exactly satisfies the equations. Thus, the theory is true of the corre​sponding models. But Giere also holds that the conception of truth involved here has no epistemological significance. The truth relation consists of a formal correspondence between the state​ments which characterize a model and the model itself, because it reduces to a matter of defini​tion. 
    Giere believes, on the other hand, that the relationship between the model and the world cannot be one of truth or falsity. The reason is that the relationship is not one between linguistic entities and real objects, but one between abstract and real objects. So, where van Fraassen thinks that the desired relation​ship between model and reality is one of isomorphism, Giere sees it only as one of similarity. A system is identified by means of a theoretical hypothesis that specifies the relevant respects according to which, as well as the degrees to which, a system is similar to a designated model. For instance, such a hypothesis could be the identifica​tion of the earth and the sun as a system very close to a two-particle Newtonian model with an inverse square central force. That which gives the model its represen​tative function and epistemological significance is not truth, but something else. Unfortunately, Giere never tells us what this is. He maintains, however, that by understanding theories not as somehow representing reality, one is able to avoid the trap of the standard view into which almost all proponents of the semantic approach stumble. For, as he con​cludes, “it tries to forge a direct semantic link between the statements characteriz​ing the model and the world - thus eliminat​ing the role of models altogether.”​[9]​
     I agree with Giere's conclusion about theories, but I think that he has arrived at it from wrong premises. I take his position to be right when he says that models cannot be true or false. But in his attempt to elaborate the semantic approach, Giere seems to conflate models as interpretations of theories with models as conceptual mapping of real systems. As he stresses himself after having introduced the physicists' usage of models of system: “Moreover, this terminology even overlaps nicely with the usage of the logicians for whom a model of a set of axioms is an object, or a set of objects, that satisfies the axioms.” What makes it confusing is that the models of a theory stake out the possible states of affairs which, ex hypothesis, can make the axioms true. Thus any semantic interpretation of a formal system in terms of models is a specification of the truth conditions for that system. In contrast, a model as mapping of a real system is a simplified and an idealized picture of a specific part of the world. Such a picture rests on a set of assumptions that attrib​utes certain characteris​tics to the physical object or system in question. These assumptions do not act as an interpretation of the theory, but as an account of certain phenomena.
      In what follows I shall take issue with the semantic approach with regard to two major claims: (i) the immediate interpre​tation of theory is a model of abstract objects; and (ii) a theory consists of a set of descriptive sentences, each of which has a certain truth value.​[10]​ I take these two requirements as being defining features of the semantic theory, in spite of the fact that a proclaimed supporter like Giere only argues for (i). The main idea underlying the semantic approach to a scientific theory is that of an axiomatic system which is supplied with a meaning through a formal interpretation in which every symbol is assigned an abstract object or property. Such an assignment forms a class of models or structures each of which makes the axioms and the theorems formally true. The theory is therefore objec​tively true if, and only if, one of its models represents the world in the way things really are.
     The first requirement, according to which the interpretation of a theory relies on a medium of abstract objects, presupposes a top-down account of meaning. The semantic view is not a bottom-up account, according to which it is the acquaintance with the physical practice that conveys meaning to the axioms. Rather, it is an account in which statements about observation and experi​mental operations derive their meaning from the basic principles of a theory. An interpreta​tion is possible only if the interpretandum is explicated in terms of the interpretans whose meaning is already known to the interpreter. We need a home medium into which we can translate what is not understandable, and through which we get to know its meaning. On the present approach, the home medium is a domain of abstract objects. But how do we get to know this realm of abstract objects on the first hand? It seems not very likely that we grasp the meaning of a theory, because we are immediately acquainted with such abstract objects. Why should we have better access to a domain of abstract objects than to the physical world which we can observe with or without instru​ments?
     A man like van Fraassen holds, of course, that scientific activity is one of construction rather than discovery. Construc​tion of models is at the center of scientific activity. But after the creation they live a life of their own. As he says: “The language used to express the theory is neither basic nor unique: the same class of structures could well be described in radically different ways, each with its own limitations.”​[11]​ So models have an ontologically independent status of their constructors. Neither are they part of the physical world. Consequently, models have apparently the same status as Popper’s third world. This makes one suspicious, for how do we have the ability to ascertain that such a world exists other than by reifying and hypostasizing mental ideas? And even if one grants abstract objects a place in a third world, it is doubtful that we get to know the meaning of scientific terms by consulting this world rather than the physical world. One does not have to know a certain class of structures in order to appreciate the connection between the terms of the theory and what they refer to in the world; on the contrary, it is only in so far as one can already grasp the reference of these terms that one is even in a position to understand what the model is all about. Indeed, it is only in so far as one has an independent grasp of the reference of the particular statements in particular languages that one is able to understand what the model amounts to at all. We cannot recognize and individu​ate such objects if it were not for the existence of physical objects and our beliefs about them. All meaning stems originally from our interaction with the real world, and a satisfactory theory of scientific theories must reflect such a fact. It is somehow strange that empiricists like Popper and van Fraassen hold that we don’t have the cognitive power to justify any claim going beyond our visual experience, but believe that we have the necessary cognitive means to grasp the existence of those really unobservable, abstract objects that supply theories with meaning. In my opinion, semantic models are ontologically vacuous, since a theory of meaning can and should do without self-subsisting abstract objects. 
     Let us now turn to the second requirement concerning scientific theories as possessors of a descriptive content, which means that they have a certain truth value. Although Giere correctly denies it, I would say that by doing so he is not a proper representa​tive for the semantic approach. Instead he seems to move closer to Nancy Cartwright.​[12]​ She, for her part, has always been critical of the semantic approach. She believes, neverthe​less, that theories tell lies; that they are always false, in spite of the fact that she also holds that fundamental laws have immense explanatory power but lack any factual content.
     Although her view is grossly inconsistent given the way she has expressed it, I have most sympathy for Cartwright: I think she is right in stressing the impor​tance of models for the applica​tion of theories and the missing facticity of fundamental laws. She is wrong, however, about the falsity and explainability of theories. Since theories are neither false nor true, they do not explain any non-linguistic phenome​na. If theories had had a factual content, they would have been false, for they are far from accurate in their description of real phenomena.​[13]​ A theory, however, is nothing but a set of sentences formulated in a specific and well-defined language of science that sets forth our possibili​ties of descrip​tion, and in so being, a theory can merely be used to explain the linguistic action of the scientist, in the same way as the appeal to social rules may explain social actions. Most often the language of a physical theory will be a mathematical defined language.
     Besides the fact that scientific theories are very inaccurate in case they actually were descriptions of concrete physical systems, which other arguments support the view that theories should not be considered as being true or false? I believe that there are further considerations which point in the same direction. If one looks upon theories which we regard acceptable and useful today, one must admit that they contain a far richer mathematical struc​ture than what usually is accorded a possibility of real counter​parts; even among those people who consider theories to be true or false. An example is the theory of electrodynamics. The fundamen​tal equations are linear differen​tial equations of second order in space and time. They give rise to two sets of solutions, the retarded and the advanced solutions, depending on the boundary conditions available.​[14]​ Only those boundary conditions which can be associated with the retarded solutions seem to be realized in nature, since only the retarded propagation of electromagnetic effects is observed in nature. Assume, now, that theories consist of statements which have a descriptive content.  This would make only half of Maxwell's theory true. The other half as expressed by the advanced solutions would be false because no boundary conditions exist that makes them true. Consequently, we would have a theory that is both true and false. How can this be?
    Another example is the special theory of relativity. In its most basic formulation the theory can be stated in terms of two invariant relations. The four-interval vector expresses an invariant relationship between space and time, s2 = x2 + y2+ z5 – c2t2, and the four-momentum vector does the same with respect to mass and energy, E2 = p2c2 + m2c4. From these formulas we can derive the Lorentz-transformations. Since energy, momentum, and mass appear as second order terms in the four-momentum vector, they can take on both positive and negative values. The negative values are nevertheless looked upon with great reluc​tance, for at least two reasons: either such values are consid​ered to be entirely without physical significance; or, if they have some physical meaning, such values are definitely not present in nature. The adherents of the descriptive view of theories have a problem in both cases. In the first case it is difficult to understand that other intrinsic properties like electric charge, color, weak charge, bradyon number, lepton number, and strange​ness can exist in two mutually opposite versions but neither energy nor rest mass. If one thinks of them as having a physical significance, however, the next problem becomes the obvious fact that no particles with negative mass or energy have ever been discovered. Once more we seem to have a theory which makes both true and false claims about the physical world. How is this possible?
     It is clear that both examples rely on the existence of second order terms in the basic equations of physics. But there are many other mathematical features of theories which can only be given a literal meaning by reification and postulation. For instance, imaginary numbers, complex functions, delta functions, matrices, infinite quantities, singularities, vector spaces, etc. Just consider Quantum Mechanics. In its most common mathematical formula​tion it is written down in terms of vectors forming an abstract vector space. The symbol |   around a letter indicates that the letter is a name of a vector, so that | Astands for the vector called A. A collection of vectors makes up the basis of a vector space and its dimension is then defined by the number of vectors which are said to be orthogonal to one another. In other words the number of basis vectors | A1, | A2, ..., | AN is equal to an N-dimensio​nal vector space if, and only if, every value of i and j from 1 through N is such that i ≠ j, and  Ai | Aj  = 0. It is also the case that any vector in such an N-dimensio​nal vector space can be described by N-numbers. Now, in the algorithm of quantum mechanics vectors are taken to represent physical states of affairs, physical possible situations, and these vectors are called state vectors. It means that every physical system is associated with some vector space, where all its possible states; that is, all possible values of the various quantities with which it is furnished, correspond to some basis vector in this vector space. 
     In addition to the vectors, the algorithm of quantum mechanics contains operators, another kind of mathematical entity that transforms a vector into a new one. An operator on a vector space constitutes a definite prescription for how a vector space can be mapped onto itself: for any vector | B in the vector space on which O is an operator, O| B = | B' , where | B'   is some vector in the same vector space. One form of operators, called linear operators, is of special interest in the quantum mechani​cal formalism. These operators on an N-dimensional vector space can be represented by N2-numbers, or rather can be described in terms of N2-numbers in a matrix according to the following rule: Oij = Ai |O|Aj.  A vector | B is said to be an eigenvector of O with an eigenvalue a, if B ≠ 0 and O| B = a| B; that is, a vector | B is an eigenvector of O, if O generates a new vector along the same line as | B and with the length a relative to the length of | B. Linear operators are, in the quantum mechanical formalism, supposed to represent measurable pro​perties, the so-called observables, as they are considered as operators on the vector space associated with the system. Physical states of affairs and observables are then connected in the following way: If the vector represen​ting some particular physical state is an eigenvector of the operator, which is associated with a particu​lar measurable property of the system, and it has eigenvalue a, then the state is an eigenstate and has at the value a of that particular observable.
     A realist interpretation of physical theories presumably requires that every mathematical property refers to something in reality. The realist cannot simply deny that a mathematical quanti​ty must have a real counterpart on the ground that it does not correspond to a measurable quantity. But any other criterion for which mathemati​cal features one can regard as having a representative function, and for which one cannot, would be an arbitrary estimate. For if, according to the semantic realist, the reference of a term is determined by its meaning, then the truth conditions for any mathematical statements containing this term guarantee that the term has a referent in a model.
My conclusion is therefore that the model theoretical approach to theories does not establish a satisfactory semantics for scientific terms. This is because it introduces abstract entities as elements of meaning which we must know when we understand a theory, and because it takes theories to be true or false. The latter assumption is one the view shares with earlier opinions on theories that also considered them to have a representa​tive function. It should ascertain that the meaning of theories can extend downwards to the level of the scientific practice. But there is not much to support any of these two assumptions upon a closer scrutiny.  
     In some respects, I think the positivists came closer to a correct account of theories. They wanted to see the meaning of theories as extending upwards from our interaction with the physical world to theory, although they delineated that world as consisting of objects of our immediate experience. Where their project failed was in making a semantic distinction between theoretical terms and observation terms. For any term of a theory can in principle serve as observation terms, if it is possible to fix its reference through observational and experimental practice. This contention may form a better starting point for an adequate semantics for scientific theories.


	4.  The Linguistic View on Theories.

Brian Ellis once wrote: “We do not have to believe in the reality of Newtonian point masses or of Einsteinian inertial frames or in the existence of the perfectly reversible heat energies of classical thermodynam​ics to accept these various theories, for none of these entities has any causal role in the explanations provided by the theories in question. Consequently, it is not necessary to think of these theories as being literally descriptive of the underlying causal processes of nature.” ​[15]​ But if theories do not give us any literal description of the underlying causal processes of nature how then do they serve us? My suggestion is that theories provide us with a vocabulary and the rules for using this vocabulary in the context of a model to formulate causal explanations.
     A natural language contains a vocabulary and a set of syntactic and semantic rules which one must follow in order to form well-formed and meaningful combinations of words taken from the vocabulary. The language as such is neither true nor false: it does not state anything. But it can be used to describe and ascertain facts. We can form declarative sentences and the combination of words by which we do this becomes first true or false when someone intentionally utters or states them to convey information about those facts. A natural language is also an open language in the sense that new words can be incorporated into its vocabulary so long as they obey the rules of that language. And it is universal in the sense that every domain of reality to be recognized corresponds to a certain segment of such a language.
     A scientific theory constitutes a language too. It contains a vocabulary and some precise and explicit syntactic rules for how the vocabulary must be put together. In many sciences the vocabulary and the rules of language are often given a mathematical representation in order to give the terms a precise definition. In contrast to the semantic view, I hold that the arrow of interpretation goes bottom-up as much as top-down. When we are establishing a convention for such a representation, we give an interpretation of the main terms of a particular science which defines the precise rules of their usage. The meaning of these terms is already recognized in virtue of their function in an experimental and observational practice, and they are carried with this practice regardless of the fact that theories in which they are represented may change. Thus the same terms are given different mathematical representation by different theories. For instance Newton’s so-called laws of motion are mathematical symbols arranged according to some definite rules for how the vocabulary of classical mechanics such as ‘uniform motion,’ ‘acceleration,’ ‘force,’ ‘position,’ and ‘mass’ must be interrelated. Those terms related to our everyday experience with physical objects. We can say that Newton’s mechanics gives one interpretation of these fundamental terms. The theory of relativity gives another interpretation of the use of the same terms. Consequently, I suggest that the basic vocabulary of, say, classical mechanics, is borrowed from the practice of science and were developed long before they were incorporated in Newton’s theory. 
     Explicit linguistic rules normally lay down the use of the vocabulary by defining the words as analytical determinations of how particular expressions are to be understood. But are definitions not the result of some a priori stipulation; that is are they not true by definitions, as when we decide that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ mean the same thing? Not really. Statements like ‘Force is the same as mass times acceleration’, although expressing a definition, are not the result of any a priori specification. Rather such statements can be meaning-constituting and nevertheless not true. We should regard definitions as a kind of analytic a posteriori statements. They are ‘analytic-in-a-theory’ but not true, if true at all, by virtue of meaning alone. Experience has had no input into our definition of the word ‘bachelor’. By introducing this word, we have, in the interest of linguistic simplification, merely made it possible for one to do the work of a complex of words. Naturally, such words can occur in a theory too. But Newton XE "Newton, Isaac" ’s first law gives us a new definition of natural motion, i.e. motion that needs no explanation – a definition at odds with Aristotle XE "Aristotle" ’s. The law of inertia is a rule-conferring definition that lays down the stipulation that henceforth natural motion is rectilinear.  What we require of such a stipulation is that it is empirically adequate – not that it is true. Newton’s second law similarly yields a new definition of the concept of force – a concept we already possessed – and expresses it in terms of concepts that were also already familiar. Aristotle’s own concept of force had its roots in the power familiar to human experience – from the need to raise a boulder, bend a bow and draw a cart. Such experience delivers, if you will, the word’s primary referential meaning. This meaning is then gradually extended through the introduction of new criteria that specify the standard operations for measuring force. Via definitional linkages with the concepts “mass” and “acceleration” the concept of force receives its theoretical meaning. Starting with its primordial referential meaning there accrues to the concept, first with Aristotle and later with Newton, an increasingly theoretical content that contributes to the word’s ideal extension. The theoretical meaning, however, is susceptible of modification if experience shows that allegiance to the model XE "model"  shifts, thereby causing the need for a revision of theoretical meaning. So what happened in the move from Aristotle’s theory to Newton’s was that science’s commitment to a model (or a family of models) changed. 
      A scientific theory distinguishes itself from an ordinary language in that its vocabu​lary is not very large, it consists of an explicitly defined language in the sense that the rules of combining these terms are explicitly stated. Also a theory is a closed language in contrast to any ordinary language. It is impossible to add whatever term one likes into its list of words, or to change the manner in which some of terms are defined. If somebody tries, he would end up with a different theory. Furthermore, science may yield radically different languages to describe the underlying causal structure much like the natural languages. Finally, a theory does not contain a universally applicable language. It applies to a restricted domain of particular models.
     How then do theories and models fit together? Well, theories provide the language by which we describe models, and models can be used to articulate concepts and construct new theories and they may be used to produce fresh hypotheses and explanations. The mathematical symbols are supplied with a meaning and their represen​tational value must be determined by some conception of reference. The first stage is closely associated the physi​cist’s theoretical tradition and experimental practice. The next stage in the development of an interpretation consists of an elaboration of what sort of theoretical commitments the theory expresses: thereaf​ter can the discussion begin about the extent with which a given inter​pretation can be justified beyond the operatio​nal level. Thus, the question rises whether we can be certain that these commitments are external, and not merely internal, to the linguistic framework of the theory. Models, on the other hand, start out as abstracted and idealized representations of concrete systems guided by theoretical and experimental considerations, and then they may be revised under the impression of how well the application of some theory produces successful explanations. 
      There is no fundamental theory that tells us how the world really is. We may be able to formulate unifying theories, but this only means that we have been able to construct a language in which we can speak about different domains that previously could not be spoken about in one language.
	

     
	5. Conclusion
Theories are neither verifiable nor falsifiable because they do not form literary descriptions of the causal structure of the world. They consist of a vocabulary and some linguistic rules for combining the terms of this vocabulary. The effect is that theories as principles of description do not state the facts. Models, however, are abstract representations of concrete systems. It is first when a scientist applies a particular theory on a model that she can produces explanations or predictions which then can be confirmed or disconfirmed. Theories can be judged to be inadequate for calculation based on the assumptions made by a model. For instance, experiments and models built on the results of these experiments show that Newton's mechanics is not an appropriate theory for describing large gravitational objects, objects having a very high velocity, and objects obeying the quantum of action. Providing the linguistic rules for talking meaningfully about the physical phenomena within the context of models concerning middle size objects with a slow velocity, classical mechanics is entirely adequate despite certain experimen​tal findings outside the domain of the models seem to overrule it. The negative results merely curtail its domain of applica​tion. A theory may still serve as the basis for the scientific practice by making most of our experi​ences in the field under​standable as long as its usage is confined to certain models of objects.
     When we have to get rid of the old theory altoget​her as in the case of Aristotle’s theory of physics, it happens because in the long run the language of the theory proved to be inadequate in most or all contexts. Sometimes, however, the development of science consists of restricting the application of a language as in the case of Newton’s mechanics because its vocabulary has shown its adequacy within certain limitations. Until we get a new and adequate theory which takes care of previously unanswer​able observations, we may not even see their significance for the old theory. And if we get a new theory, the scope of old theory may very well merely be restricted. The decisive point is that as long as the language of the old theory helps us to accomplish causal explanations of the phenomena, when we apply it to a certain model, we can use it as descriptive successful.  
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